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FROM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO
OBEDIENT CONSUMERISM?
INFLUENCES OF MARKET-BASED
ACTIVISM AND ECO-CERTIFICATION
ON FOREST GOVERNANCE©
BY EMILY WALTER*

This article looks at the implicit politics of ecocertification as an activist strategy. Drawing on the
example of the Forest Stewardship Council and forestry
activism in British Columbia during the 1990s, this
article considers underlying norms of the certification
approach, the inherent limitations of its institutional
setting, and the empowering and disempowering
implications for participants in forest policy debates.
These implicit politics may have a disciplining influence
on public debate regarding the future of environmental
regulation, and governance more generally, at a time
when wider experimentation with alternative approaches
is both necessary and otherwise timely. The analysis
draws attention to the continuing need to focus on issues
of democratic control and authority, rather than settling
for governance mechanisms consistent with neoliberal
ideology.
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The concept of civil disobedience conjures images of peaceful
protesters against oppressive governments and unjust laws. But with the
expansion of economic globalization and perceived losses in states' abilities
to regulate companies, activists have sought alternative ways of more
directly addressing corporate power. Market campaigns, involving boycotts
on the one hand and endorsements of companies committed to particular
practices on the other, have taken on prominent status in the emerging
response to domestic and transnational influences on states' regulatory
capacity.
Taking activism against unsustainable logging as an example,
transnational environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and
their allies have developed a new, civil society-based, global institution, the
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which develops standards for sustainable
logging and oversees the certification of companies' operations that meet
those standards. The FSC is recognized as a model NGO-initiated, multistakeholder certification regime with high environmental standards, third
party monitoring, and substantial provisions for transparent and
participatory procedures. Since its inception in 1993, the FSc has grown
rapidly and has come to play a significant role in tropical and temperate
forest protection campaigns by prominent transnational ENGOS. Such
market-based activism has spurred individual and collective responses from
the industry side, notably efforts to develop competing standards and rapid
expansion of the certified land area, as well as from governments intent
upon certifying public forest lands and developing policy perspectives that
make efficient use of voluntary initiatives. In the academic literature,
commentators have greeted the emergence of civil society-based
monitoring and certification with mixed, but generally enthusiastic,
response. They emphasize ideas of flexibility, legal pluralism, and
pragmatism in a world largely without social and environmental regulatory
capacity at the international level and, in many cases, limited domestic
capacity.
The forests of British Columbia during the 1990s were a site of
intense market campaigning. Market campaigns have the goal of furthering
wilderness protection for some highly desired locations and promoting ecocertification to ensure appropriate logging practices for the rest. These
tools adopt market pressures and private regulatory systems as primary
tools for achieving these goals. One consequence is that over the decade,
environmentalist activism around industrial forestry in British Columbia
shifted-not entirely, but significantly-away from agitation directed at
government and toward the direct targeting of logging companies. The
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major environmental groups, in particular, embraced this shift. Through
market campaigns, these groups discovered new leverage, and an ability to
move forward with civil society-based initiatives that can influence logging
companies' activities, without getting bogged down in state-based
processes.
This embrace represents a profound change in the way those groups
objecting to extractive, industrial forestry conceive of the challenges facing
them, express themselves, and exert their power. While some of the
achievements of this effort are indisputable, the shift also reflects some
troubling trends. While the ENGOs' turn to market campaigning has been

likened to the discovery of dynamite, the shift can also be described as a
move from civil disobedience to cranky, but nevertheless obedient,
consumerism. Implicit is a subtle shift in norms of governance, including a
redrawing of the public-private divide. Is this a social justice enhancing,
ecologically effective reworking of the best markets have to offer? Or, is
this a version of what Steven Bernstein calls the "compromise of liberal
environmentalism"' in which environmental protection, social goals, and
ultimately democratic authority become secondary to the liberal economic
order? The market campaigns by transnational ENGOs in British Columbia
owe their success in part to the strategy's embrace of the liberal economic
order as being not just consistent with, but at the heart of, environmental,
protection. The FSC, being the most stringent and demanding certification
regime available in the forestry context, is an important testing ground for
what compromises might be inherent in the certification approach.
This article looks at the implicit politics of the certification
approach and draws out the counterproductive elements of a strategy that
has generally been viewed as a great success within the environmental
community. Drawing on the British Columbia example, I consider
underlying norms of the certification approach, the inherent limitations of
its institutional setting, and the empowering and disempowering
implications for participants in forest policy debates. I argue that these
implicit politics have a disciplining influence on public debate regarding the
future of environmental regulation, and governance more generally, at a
time when wider experimentation with alternative approaches is both
necessary and otherwise timely. This analysis draws attention to the
Steven Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002).
2 Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, "Globalization, Internationalization and Liberal
Environmentalism: Exploring Non-Domestic Sources of Influence on Canadian Environmental Policy"
in Robert Boardman & Deborah VanNijnatten, eds., CanadianEnvironmental Policy: Context and
Cases, 2d ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002) 212 at 216.
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continuing need to focus on issues of democratic control and authority,
rather than settling for governance mechanisms consistent with neo-liberal
ideology.
I.

ACTIVISM AGAINST UNSUSTAINABLE LOGGING IN
BRITISH COLUMBIA DURING THE 1990s: FROM CIVIL
PROTEST TO MARKETS

Logging has long been a central part of the British Columbia
identity and economy. The province's natural supply of timber fueled its
early development, and although the forest industry accounts for only about
6 per cent of the provincial gross domestic product,3 it remains an
important export industry. Canada accounts for 13.5 per cent of world
softwood lumber harvest, and British Columbia alone accounts for 6.6 per
cent. The Canadian role in world exports is proportionally greater. About
one-quarter of world softwood lumber exports come from British
Columbia, and almost one-half derive from Canada.4 Most of British
Columbia's exports go to the United States, Japan, and the European
Union.
Environmentalist protests against poor logging practices, especially
clear-cutting in the coastal rainforests, became a major political issue in
British Columbia during the 1980s. The regulation of the industry had
traditionally been carried out by corporatist bargaining, and during the
early part of the decade, the industry enjoyed a period of so-called
"sympathetic administration," in which the provincial government left the
industry much to its own devices. But by the late 1980s, environmentalist
concerns about the ecological damage being caused by the logging industry
were becoming well-known. Unsustainable harvest levels, poor
regeneration on cut over land, damaged streams and rivers, landslides, and
enormous clear-cuts were apparent and increasingly public problems.
Opportunities for accountability seeking by the public were limited.
The companies had tight control over most of provincial forest land
through a tenure system established in the 1950s. The province's economic
reliance on the industry made the provincial political leaders vulnerable to
dissuasion from tighter regulation or strict enforcement wheneverjobs and
3 Lillian Hallin, "Logging and Forest Products" (17 April 2001), online: A
Guide to the B.C.
Economy and Labour Market <http://www.guidetobceconomy.org/chap4/chap4-3.html> (date

accessed: 18 May 2003) at Figure 7.
British Columbia Forest Industry, "Fact Book 2000," online: Council of Forest Industries
<http://www.cofi.org/reports/factbook2000/FACTBOOK%202000.pdf> (date accessed: 1 August
2003) at 6, 9.
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provincial revenues would be impacted. Given the relatively closed policy
process and few opportunities for accountability within the legal system,
civil disobedience became an important part of political participation
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In some places, environmentalist
concerns and frustration with lack of progress on Aboriginal title have led
to new political coalitions and unprecedented civil disobedience.
In 1993, this groundswell peaked at Clayoquot Sound. Nearly eight
hundred people were arrested at logging road blockades. Protesters held
demonstrations on the lawn of the provincial legislature, at Ministry of
Forests' offices around the province, and at courthouses where civil
disobedience trials were being held. The civil disobedience trials were, for
a time, a focus for debate on the democratic process.' There was also
widespread public sympathy and debate in the British Columbia media
about the issues.
During this period, the major environmental groups, and some local
groups, took steps toward international campaigning. They took tours of
Europe, visiting parliaments as well as major buyers of British Columbia
forest products. Leaders of First Nations also toured Europe, spreading the
word that companies were logging in their traditional territories without
respecting Aboriginal title to the land and in a manner unacceptable to
them.
In 1992, European environmentalists called for a boycott of British
Columbia forest products. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth
campaigned in the United Kingdom, Germany, and other European
countries highlighting British Columbia's forest practices. British Columbia
Forests Minister Claude Richmond predicted that given the failure of the
Earth Summit in Rio de 'Janeiro to achieve an international convention on
forests, more boycotts were inevitable.6 As early as October 1992, major
companies began losing contracts with buyers. During the summer of 1993,
a coalition of British environmental groups held protests in London.
Robert Kennedy Jr. of the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defence Council
gave his organization's support to the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation of
Clayoquot Sound. Cultural Survival and Conservation International were
also involved. Greenpeace organized an international day of action on
Canada Day, emphasizing the heritage being lost with rallies in London,
Canberra, Sydney, Germany, Japan, Austria, and several Canadian cities.
Greenpeace asked European forest ministers to adopt trade embargoes
Ronald Maclsaac & Anne Champagne, Clayoquot Mass Trials: Defending the
Rainforest
(Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society, 1994).
6 Claude Richmond, "Rio Summit: the real message for us" Vancouver Sun (9 July 1992) A17.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.41, NOS. 2 & 3

against wood and paper products from Clayoquot Sound. In the fall, First
Nations leaders were also calling for a boycott.
By 1994, Greenpeace was coordinating a highly successful
international campaign, with Clayoquot Sound achieving notoriety
comparable to the Brazilian Amazon. Reports from this period emphasized
the significance of the markets at risk. One report estimated that a $1
billion European market for pulp and paper was in jeopardy given
Greenpeace's involvement and the credibility that organization enjoyed in
Europe.7
The eco-certification movement also had its beginnings in this
period. In 1993, under the leadership of the WWF and allies, the founding
assembly of the FSC was held in Toronto. The idea was to create an ecolabel recognizable worldwide, which could serve as the carrot to balance
against the stick of boycotts. FSC members initially developed principles and
criteria that would apply globally, and since then, regional FSC affiliates
have been developing standards which interpret the principles and criteria
at the regional level. The Forest Stewardship Council of British Columbia
(FSC-Bc) recently completed its process for developing standards, which as
of February 2003, were pending approval by the International Board of the
FSC.

The Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA) began
considering a code of ethics as a response to the environmentalist
campaigns as early as January 1992, and opened a Brussels office in
November 1992. By this time the federal government was also investing
$1.5 million in a counter campaign, promoting Canadian forest products
internationally. In 1993, the year the Clayoquot Sound protests peaked,
major industry actors formed the Canadian Sustainable Forestry
Certification Coalition, which in 1994 asked the Canadian Standards
Association (affiliated with the International Standards Organization (Iso))
to develop standards for sustainable forest management.
Also in the early 1990s, the provincial New Democratic Party (NDP)
government brought in a series of policy reforms, including: the treaty
process to address First Nations' demands; a stakeholder-based planning
process to establish and build consensus around land-use decisions; a new
Forest Practices Code to improve logging practices on public land; a
strategy for park creation; and a new Timber Supply Review to take stock
of existing forests and set allowable harvest limits. Clayoquot Sound
received special treatment. The provincial government created a scientific
panel to develop rules for how logging would be carried out in the region,
Keith Baldrey, "A billion-dollar war of the woods: Greenpeace takes on
B.C.'s forest industry
in Europe" Vancouver Sun (29 January 1994) B1.
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instituted a regional board with representatives from local First Nations to
make development decisions, and declared much of the land off limits to
logging. Meanwhile, the federal government pursued the development of
criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management, attempting to
build international support for standardization and a forests convention, all
of which could enhance Canadian access to international markets. The
federal-provincial Canadian Council of Forest Ministers launched a $4.5
million program to define and create guidelines for sustainable forestry,
and to promote the Canadian industry as a sustainable one.8
After the Clayoquot Sound crisis, public support for civil
disobedience on the logging issue dwindled. The great push for change that
had driven grandmothers and high school students to stand alongside more
veteran protesters at Clayoquot Sound had yielded results. For a few years,
the NDP government enjoyed a relative peace. When the major
environmental groups geared up again in 1997 to protest logging in the
Central Coast region of British Columbia, they had difficulty winning
support in the province for their campaign. This time, acts of civil
disobedience were carried out by small groups of people with a very strong
local concern, relatively radical environmentalists, and international visitors
coordinated by Greenpeace.
While market campaigning was part of the Clayoquot effort, this
time market campaigning was the centrepiece. Visits to public institutions
took a lower profile, replaced with visits to company offices, and small acts
of civil disobedience designed to make a good news story and support the
market campaigns, for example, by hanging banners from barges carrying
logs for export. European environmentalists again called on European
buyers to boycott British Columbia timber products, and held protests in
London, England. Through 1997 to 1998, the campaign expanded to British
home-renovation stores and chemical companies. Two targeted companies,
Western Forest Products and Interfor, announced they would pursue FSC
certification, while MacMillan Bloedel announced it would move from
clear-cutting to "variable retention" in its British Columbia operations. 9
Although British Columbia's environmental community was also
voicing the message that the new Forest Practices Code was illusory, and
8 Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, Sustainable Forests:A Canadian Commitment (Hull:

Minister of Natural Resources, 1992); Canadian Council of Forest Ministers, Defining Sustainable
Forest Management: A CanadianApproach to Criteria and Indicators (Ottawa: Natural Resources

Canada, 1995); Gordon Hamilton, "A Global War with Cold War Techniques" Vancouver Sun (30
June 1993) Al.
9 Edward Alden, "Canadian logger bows to green pressure to end clear-cutting" FinancialTimes
[London] (10 June 1998) 16.
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that it was business as usual in the forests, this message was not embraced
by the public in British Columbia. A backlash ensued, with the Premier
calling environmentalists who were working with American lumber
interests and European environmentalists "enemies of British Columbia"
for purportedly undermining the British Columbia forest economy."
Despite the backlash in British Columbia, the strategy was in many
ways successful for the major ENGOs. Transnational and U.S.-based ENGO
involvement increased. In December, 1998 a coalition of environmental
groups placed an advertisement in The New York Times listing the
companies that had committed to phasing out products from old-growth
forests, including IBM, Kinko's, Levi Strauss, and Hallmark. By this time,
the British buyers' group known as the "95 + Group" was estimated to
represent a market of 2.5 billion British pounds per year. By May 2000, the
Vancouver Sun reported that the "[p]ublic relations battle of the war in the
woods is over ...
[C]ompanies are turning to audited eco-certification
schemes ... ."" Former Council of Forest Industries Vice-President John
Powles attributed the end of the "war in the woods" to U.S. buyers
changing from resisters to demanders of certified products. t2
In the Central Coast campaign, the companies operating in the
region entered private negotiations with the ENGO coalition, leading to an
agreement that largely met the ENGOs' demands: there would be a conflictfree period of eighteen months in exchange for no logging in thirty
undeveloped watersheds.' 3 Further negotiations brought others into the
dialogue, including the Province and other recognized stakeholders, leading
to a final agreement: the market campaigns would stop for two years while
a two-year planning process could be carried out, 13 per cent of the land
would be park, logging on 11 per cent would be deferred, and logging on
the remaining land would be ecologically-based (an undefined term).1 4 The
NDP government, which previously waged public relations campaigns to
rebut the transnational ENGO's market actions, now adopted Greenpeace's
"Great Bear Rainforest" language when describing the agreement and
region. The only loud voices of discontent came from the Industrial, Wood
10 Justine Hunter, "Forest protests promised" Vancouver Sun (22 April 1997) B6.
11 Gordon Hamilton, "B.C.'s Green Tag Revolution" Vancouver Sun (5 May
2000) Al.
12 Ibid.

13 Gordon Hamilton, "Coastal loggers seek eco-truce" Vancouver Sun (16 March 2000)
Dl.
Prominent companies active on the Central Coast included Interfor, West Fraser Timber, Western
Forest Products, Fletcher Challenge Canada, Canadian Forest Products, and Weyerhaeuser.
14 Gordon Hamilton, "Forest firms expect the role of hero will cost them"
Vancouver Sun (5
April 2001) A5.
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and Allied Workers of Canada labour union and coastal mayors. Tseporah
Berman of the Coastal Rainforest Coalition commented:
"The government
15
process."
the
in
engage
to
but
choice
no
has
When the Liberal party was elected in British Columbia in the fall
of 2001, the new government endorsed the Central Coast deal and
announced they would use a similar process for the North Coast. The
Minister of Sustainable Resource Management stated explicitly that while
the Liberals had not intended to follow through with the plan, they had
changed their minds to prevent the market campaigns from restarting. 6 In
other parts of the province, however, the new government rejected land-use
plans that had already been drafted at stakeholder tables. British Columbia
Sierra Club Executive Director Bill Wareham attributed the failure of at
least one plan for an interior region to the absence of market campaigns:
"In those places where we didn't have market pressure, they have taken
those plans apart.""
The certification trend also had an impact on the provincial
government's small business program under which the government offers
small businesses licences to harvest timber but carries out much of the
management work itself. The NDP began an initiative to enable these
licences to include certification standards in 2000 with test projects, and the
Liberal government recently made the necessary legislative amendments
to allow licences to require licensees to meet certification standards in
addition to legislated ones.'8 Which certification standards may be required
were not defined, although initial efforts appear directed at isO 14001
certification.
At the same time, British Columbia continues to face many of the
challenges that were apparent in 1990. A group of policy researchers who
reviewed the extent of forest policy change in British Columbia over the
1990s concluded that "the government's search for sustainability, whether
measured by environmental, social, economic, or political indicators, had
failed."' 9 One key finding that researchers found was that policies dealing
with harvesting rights and the volume a licence holder is licensed to cut per
Gordon Hamilton, "Poll finds majority agree coastal rainforest should be protected"
VancouverSun (29 April 2000) E2.
16 Vaughn Palmer, "Liberals Bow to Big Guns on Preservation" Vancouver Sun (23 May 2002)
A20.
17

Gordon Wilson, "Liberals sign on to NDP forest plan" VancouverSun (16 November 2001) D1.

18 Forest Statutes Amendment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 45, s. 3.
19

Benjamin Cashore et al.,
In Search of Sustainability:British ColumbiaForest Policyin the 1990s

(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001 ) at 252.
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year dominated policy choices made in other areas, for example, forest
practices and land-use planning.2' Over the decade, although the NDP had
success with park creation, it had little impact on the underlying policy
context of the forest industry. The province has continued unsustainable
harvest levels, falling employment in the forest sector, a legislative code for
forest practices that no one calls a success and that is now being replaced
with much reduced environmental standards, unresolved conflicts with First
Nations, ongoing vulnerability to U.S. allegations of subsidy, retaliatory
trade-related actions, and further entrenchment of the power of the few
large companies that control most of the harvesting rights on public land.21
The British Columbia-based industry also faces growing international
competition in the commodity markets it has traditionally relied upon.
While British Columbia has had an abundance of high-quality standing
forests, this old-growth timber supply is dwindling, and the industry is
having to move both to lower quality and more difficult to reach forests.
The province has an oversupply of mills and a mismatch between the types
of logs the mills were designed for and the logs being harvested. Labour
costs are relatively high, and the growing cycle is long compared with
countries in warmer climates. The industry is therefore widely recognized
to be in the middle of a lengthy and painful period of restructuring caused
by a mixture of domestic and international factors.22 Patricia Marchak, a
long-time observer of the British Columbia industry, has argued that jobs
in industrial forestry in British Columbia are on the way out and that the
"move away as rapidly as possible from forest-based
province should
23
industry.,

The combination of increased transnational ENGO involvement, the
industry's focus on external markets, and dependence on the industry that
is built into the provincial forest management framework mean that both
the industry and the provincial government are shifting to external sources
of legitimacy and approval, designed around the needs of both
20

Ibid. at 247.

21 As of July 2003, five companies controlled about 40 per cent of all allocated timber harvesting

rights in the province. See Ministry of Forests, "Provincial Linkage AAC Report" (Victoria: Resource
Tenures and Engineering Branch, 11 July 2003) online: <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/ftp/hth/
external/!publish/apportionment/APTR043.pdf> (date accessed: 23 July 2003).
22 Patricia Marchak, Scott Aycock & Deborah Herbert, Falldown: Forest Policy in British

Columbia (Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation and Ecotrust Canada, 1999); Ministry of Forests,
Ready for Change: Crisis and Opportunity in the Coast Forest Industry by Peter Pearse (Vancouver:

Minister of Forests, November 2001), online: <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/library/documents/
phpreport> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).

23 Patricia Marchak, "Commentary" (1998) 119 B.C. Stud. 73 at 77.
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transnational ENGOs and the industry. Researchers concluded that market
campaigns and First Nations' property-based claims held the most promise
for shifting the status quo. 24 Does, however, the certification approach hold
reasonable promise to help address persistent problems with
unsustainability? Certainly by the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the
major environmental groups' market campaigns had become the focus of
much of the media attention to environmentalist commentary and activity.
These campaigns had not become the exclusive focus of British Columbia's
environmental community, but they had taken on a prominence that no
other form of activism enjoyed.
The appeal of market campaignsis not hard to fathom. The
boycott/certification strategy is facilitated by the concentration and exportoriented character of the British Columbia industry, and the relative
simplicity of the international ENGOs' demands for rainforest protection.
These campaigns are able to go wherever the campaigners consider the
markets to be sensitive to this type of pressure. In practice, this has meant
going to northern Europe and the United States. The non-local aspect of
these tactics matches the mobility of transnational corporations, and also
sidesteps local resistance to environmental groups' messages from unions,
rural mayors, and domestic publics sensitive to immediate job losses. The
commitment to market campaigns among transnational ENGOs also makes
sense given the absence of a global democratic political process through
which non-domestic publics can express their concerns and be represented.
Markets are a good option for environmentalists outside of British
Columbia with no effective voice.
For those within British Columbia who had attempted more
traditional forms of activism and political participation, the market.
campaigns have also enabled an end run around conventional state-based
politics, with its attendant commitments to the status quo and big business,
and an end run around conventional methods of seeking accountability
within the provincial legal framework. This legal framework has functioned
to deflect criticism of the underlying structural and institutional problems
plaguing British Columbia forestry. Path-determining elements of the legal
framework, for example the issuance, renewal, and terms of logging tenures
(issued by the Minister of Forests to private companies), or determinations
by the Province's Chief Forester of the volume a tenure holder may cut,
have proven resilient against new legal and policy developments during the
1990s that on their face might appear to imply significant change.

24 Supra note 19 at 252.
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For example, the 1994 Forest Practices Code ostensibly provided
greater opportunity for accountability seeking by the public. The Code was
introduced and publicly marketed as a major overhaul of logging practices
that would change the industry from an environmentally damaging one to
one based on the maintenance of ecosystem integrity. This regulatory
instrument was contained in a number of ways. A 6 per cent ceiling was
imposed for impacts on harvest levels. Administrative delays and refusals
to implement some provisions and amendments to provisions that had the
potential to slow the flow of fibre to mills all limited the impact of the
Code. Additionally, the administrative design of procedures apparently
created to enhance accountability to the public and enable greater public
participation actually constructed those opportunities in ways that
dissipated their impact while legitimating business as usual. Although the
ForestPracticesCode was promised as an accountability-enhancing statute,
it generated few opportunities for judicial review, because of its
discretionary design and a new complaints procedure managed by an
independent board with little power.
Judicial reviews by environmental groups that have been aimed at
other critical aspects of forest policy, including licensing and volumes
harvested, have also generally proved unsuccessful. For example, in 1993
the Sierra Club brought a judicial review testing the meaning of a
requirement for sustainability under the ForestAct, as applied to the Chief
Forester's determination of how much a licensee was permitted to
harvest.7- While the Chief Forester had attempted to bring the harvest
levels closer to amounts sustainable in the long term, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal deferred to a lower Appeal Board ruling that the harvest
level should be higher to allow a more gradual transition to sustainable
harvest levels.'s In practice, harvest levels in British Columbia remain well
above the Ministry of Forests' estimates of what is sustainable in the long
term. A systematic timber supply review carried out by the Chief Forester
from 1992 to 1996 resulted in an overall reduction of provincial allowable

25 ForestAct,
26

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 140, s. 28(g)(i).
Sierra Club of Western Canadav. Chief Forester(British Columbia) (1993), 22
Admin. L.R. (2d)

129 (S.C.). This decision was appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for mootness following an
amendment. See ForestAct, (1995) 126 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (C.A.).
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annual cut (AAc) by only 0.5 per cent. 27 As of 1999, the provincial "overcut"
was estimated as at least 18 per cent. 2'
With regard to tenures and licensing, a group of woodworkers who
lost their jobs when a licensee closed a mill attempted judicial review of the
Forest Minister's decision not to penalize the licensee. The workers alleged
that, in exchange for long-term security under the ForestAct,the company's
licence required it to continue operating the mill. The workers were unable
to overcome judicial deference toward the Forest Minister's decision.29 The
Council of the Haida Nation appears to be the only entity that has had any
success with reviewing tenure decisions, basing their attack on conflicting
property rights.3" In contrast, licence holders have had much more success
in getting courts to treat licences as a form of vested property that needs
protection against government interference, despite ambiguities in their
statutory character. For the general public, the major types of licencing
agreements between the provincial government and forest companies are
effectively perpetual (except where companies choose to give up a licence
and be compensated) and unreviewable.
Instead of fighting this disempowering legal framework, the ENGOs
were able to use market campaigns to create new space for debate about
forest policy on something closer to their own terms. They brought in new
policy actors (major buyers), actively marketed their list of demands, and
nurtured a new institution: the FSC. This new space created by ENGOs
deserves, however, more scrutiny than the "on their own terms" description
suggests.
27

Ministry of Forests, "Summary of Timber Supply Review Results 1992-1996" online: Timber

Supply Branch, Ministry of Forests <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tsb/other/review/review.htm> (date
accessed: 18 May 2003). Summary data for a second round of timber supply reviews for 1997-2002 is
not yet available.
28 Marchak, Aycock & Herbert, supra note 22 at 30 (based on data from the British Columbia
Ministry of Forests).
29
WoodworkersforFairForestPolicy v. B.C. (Ministerof Forestsand ChiefForester),[2000] B.C.J.
No. 2180 (S.C.) (QL). The author of this article was counsel for the petitioner.
30 The Haida Nation argued that their asserted Aboriginal title was an encumbrance that by law,
or through the Crown's fiduciary duty, prevented the Minister from legally renewing a logging
company's licence, or alternatively that the Minister ought to have consulted with them before
renewing the licence. The Haida won recognition that Aboriginal title, if proved, could be an
encumbrance, and recognition that they are entitled to consultation, but were unsuccessful in
invalidating the licence renewal. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's view
that the Haida must prove their title before it would constitute an encumbrance on the land, but
granted a declaration that the Crown and the licensee (Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd.) owed a duty to
consult with the Haida, based on the strength of the Haida's claim, the Crown's fiduciary duty, and the
Crown and Weyerhaeuser's awareness of the Haida's claim. See Haida Nation v. B.C. (Ministerof
Forests), [2002] 6 W.W.R. 243 (B.C.C.A.).
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ECO-CERTIFICATION AND THE FOREST STEWARDSHIP
COUNCIL

The FSC exists to develop and promote standards for sustainable
forestry. It does not directly certify companies, but rather certifies
organizations and consulting firms to carry out certifications of other
companies' logging operations according to FSC policies and procedures. Its
headquarters are located in Oaxaca, Mexico, and there are now regional
FSC groups in eight European countries, Canada, the United States, Brazil,
Colombia, and Bolivia. The regional FSC groups develop standards for their
region based on global the FSC's Principles and Criteria document.31
The WWF was a driving force behind the FSC's creation, and
remains a staunch advocate. As recounted by the FSC, the founding
assembly in 1993 included "representatives from environmental
institutions, the timber trade, the forestry profession, indigenous peoples'
organizations, community forestry groups, and forest product certification
organizations from twenty-five countries."32 Since then, the FSC has grown
dramatically, so that there are now more than twenty-nine million hectares
certified under FSC rules worldwide, in fifty-six countries. About two-thirds
of the land area managed by certified entities (that is, companies,
governments, or other associations responsible for logging operations) is
located in Europe, a further 17 per cent in North America, 12 per cent in
Latin America, and 2 to 3 per cent each in Africa and the Asia-Pacific
region.33

The FSC is composed of a General Assembly, Board, and
Secretariat. The FSC is carefully structured to balance the voting power of
different social groups. The General Assembly has three chambers:
economic, environmental, and social. Members with an economic interest
in the forest products trade must be in the economic chamber. The
environmental chamber is "limited to indigenous organizations and social
movements and assigned individuals active in promoting environmentally
appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable forest
management." The social chamber is "limited to not-for-profit, nongovernmental organizations and assigned individuals with a demonstrated
31

Forest

Stewardship Council, "FSC Principles and Criteria," online:
<http://www.fscoax.org/html/1-2.html> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
32 Forest Stewardship Council of Canada, "FSC History," online:
< http:/www.fsccanada.org/about/history.shtml > (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
33 Forest Stewardship Council, "Information on Certified Forest Sites Endorsed by the Forest
Stewardship Council (Fsc)," online: <http://www.certified-forests.org/global.htm> (date accessed: 18
May 2003).
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commitment to" these same goals. Each chamber's votes are weighted so
that they have one-third of the total voting power for the General
Assembly. Furthermore, within each chamber, northern-based
organizations and southern-based organizations-as defined by United
Nations (UN) criteria for high income countries on the one hand, and low,
middle, and upper-middle income countries on the other---each have half
the voting power. General Assembly resolutions will only pass if they
receive a two-thirds vote in each chamber. All members of the FSC may
vote in the General Assembly.34
The General Assembly elects a nine-member Board which must
include two economic chamber members, and three or four members
(alternating) from each of the environmental and social chambers. The
bylaws call once again for north-south parity, not just in the overall
composition of the Board, but among the representatives from each
chamber. Decisions are by consensus or, if none, by six votes in favour.35
Membership in the FSC is limited to organizations and individuals
that support the FSC's mission. Prospective members of the economic
chamber must "demonstrate commitment to implementing FSC principles,"
for example, by getting some of their operations certified. The Board may
consult with FSC members in the country where the applicant is based to
evaluate whether the applicant is bona fide. A member may also be
stripped of membership if the member "engages in activities contrary to the
interests of the FSC or no longer meets the membership criteria.... 3 a
The FSC derives its revenue from licensing fees charged to
organizations that are accredited to certify companies on behalf of the FSC,
fees paid by these certifying bodies to the FSC to recover costs associated
with the certification process, grants and donations, membership dues, and
returns on investments and services. The FSC accepts grants and donations
from NGOs, foundations, governments, multilateral agencies, and
individuals. 3 The FSC states that it does not accept funding from industry,
although it does accept membership fees from economic chamber
members, and fees from companies that are accredited to certify forest
Forest Stewardship Council, "Forest Stewardship Council A.C. Bylaws," online:
<http://www.fscoax.org/html/1-1.html> (date accessed: 18 May 2003) at s.22.
Ibid. at s. 56.
36

Ibid. at s. 41.

has received funding from the Austrian, Dutch, and Mexican governments, the
European Commission, Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, WWF-Netherlands, iuCNNetherlands, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (sSNc), and Summit Foundation (Forest
Stewardship Council, "Frequently Asked Questions," online: <http://www.fscoax.org/html/
fsc-faq.html> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
37The

Fsc
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companies under the FSC regime. These companies are hired by the forest
companies who apply to receive FSC certification.
The bylaws provide for the addition of national and regional
advisory boards and assemblies if there is sufficient interest in the region.
Canada has a working group that was created in 1996 to facilitate the
development of regional standards through which the FSC's overarching
principles and criteria will be applied in various regions in Canada. British
Columbia has its own working group and steering committee. The Steering
Committee has developed regional standards for British Columbia. The
first draft of the British Columbia Regional Standards was prepared
initially by a volunteer committee, and completed by a group of consultants.
FSC-BC made the draft available and accepted comments from the general
public, and some fifty-six organizations submitted comments.38 The FSC-BC
Steering Committee then appointed a technical team and invited the
provincial government to appoint a non-voting member. The team
prepared a second draft, held further public consultation, and submitted a
final draft to FSC-Canada. The standards are now pending approval by the
FSC's international board.
Most FSC certifications are carried out by transnational consulting
3
firms. Certifications by SGS-Qualifor alone account for over 50 per cent
of the land area under FSC certification." The Rainforest Alliance's
Smartwood Program has also played a dominant role as a certifier. The
only accredited certification body based in Canada is the Silva Forest
Foundation, an organization committed to the promotion of eco-forestry.
The procedures by which a certifying body or a forest company
becomes FSC-accredited also make provisions for stakeholder consultations.
For example, when Western Forest Products applied for FSC certification,
Greenpeace and others made submissions to the certifying body, SGSQualifor, detailing why Western Forest Products' operations were
inappropriate for FSC certification. However, it is difficult to identify which
companies are applying for certification at any given time.
38 Forest Stewardship Council-British Columbia, "History of the FSC-BC Initiative," online:
<http://www.fsc-bc.org/showpage.asp?pagelD=188> (date accessed: 26 May 2003).
39For example, accredited certification bodies include: Swiss transnational KPMG's Canadian
affiliate, Germany-based GFA Terra Systems, Italy-based IcLA, Switzerland-based Institut fir
Marktokologie IMO, Netherlands-based SKAL International, UK-based SGS-Qualifor and Soil
Association (an NGO), and U.S.-based Scientific Certification Systems, and the Rainforest Alliance
Smartwood Program (an NGO). See Forest Stewardship Council, "FSc Accredited Certification
Bodies," online: <http:/Avww.fscoax.org/html/5-3-1.html> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
40 Forest Stewardship Council, "% Total Certified Area By Certification Body," online:
<http://www.certified-forests.org/data/bodies.htm > (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
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Demand for FSC products has been driven by NGOs, particularly
through the organization of buyers' groups. The WWF has been a strong
advocate, leading to an agreement with the World Bank to set a target for
two hundred million additional hectares under FSC certification by 2005. 4t
Industry journals were complaining by 1998 about the high demand for
certified products and lack of supply. The vast majority of current supply
comes from Europe, and to a lesser extent, North America. The twentynine million hectares managed by FSC-certified operations is approximately
0.7 per cent of worldwide forested area. 42 In British Columbia, FSC-certified
operations have responsibility for some eighty-nine thousand hectares.
Competing certification regimes, including the Iso 14001, the Canadian
Standards Association, and Sustainable Forest Initiative of the American
Forest and Paper Association, cover far more of British Columbia's
territory. Companies with ISO certification have responsibility for about
43
forty-seven million hectares and about two-thirds of provincial AAC.
III.

CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS AS A FORM OF
GOVERNANCE

The small but growing academic commentary on regimes like the
FSC identify them as a form of social regulation or, more broadly,
governance. For example, Errol Meidinger has argued that the FSC is
among the most developed of private organizations that are taking on
functions of government, claiming to represent the public interest, and
effectively acting as "private regulatory systems."' 4 Commentators on forest
politics in British Columbia have heralded certification as a "major avenue
for the privatization of forest policy" and the FSC in particular as having
"the potential to revolutionize the governance of the forest sector," based
on its venue-shifting character and ability to influence firms' financial

41 Errol Meidinger, "'Private' Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community"
(1999-2000) 7 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 123 at 146.
42 Based on the total forested land area estimate of 3.9 billion hectares
in the ForestResources

Assessment, 2000, online: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Main Findings
<http://www.fao.org/forestry/fo/fra/index.jsp> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
43 Ministry of Forests International Relations Unit, "BC Forest Management Certification
Status

Report-December 2002," online: <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/certification/
CertificationStatusReport.pdf> (date accessed: 18 May 2003); Ministry of Forests Timber Supply
Branch, "Current Allowable Annual Cut," online: <http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tsb/other/tsa.htm> (date
accessed: 18 May 2003).

44 Supra note 41 at 232.
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incentives.45 Stepan Wood has argued that standards regimes such as the
Iso 14001 are not so much a form of private regulation as a form of
governance that reflects an interpenetration that subtly redraws
conceptions of the public and private. Consequently, Wood asserts this type
of regime "suggests the need for an alternative conception of 'government'
that moves beyond the metaphor of a public-private divide, one that defines
government as the entire array of ideas, goals and techniques by which a
and non-state authorities seek to shape human conduct to
diversity of state
46
desired ends.,
A conceptual foundation for the categorization of regimes like the
FSC as a form of social regulation can be found in legal pluralist
perspectives on law. Within this literature, the rise of lex mercatoria has
been the focal example of the transnational development of regulatory
systems outside of conventional state-based law-making; 47 corporate codes
of conduct, related NGO monitoring, and institutionalized certification
initiatives are other nascent examples. As articulated by Gunther Teubner,
"global law" emerges from multiple social groups, not just the state; it
emerges as new discourses become dominant; and it emerges from social
peripheries. Applied to the FSC case, as functional networks (initially the
transnational environmental NGO network that organized around forest
loss) became frustrated with the lack of institutional capacity within the
state-based system of regulation, they developed an alternative mechanism
with growing authority and prominence transnationally.
I do not intend to engage in a debate concerning whether this kind
of social ordering is accurately characterized as law. Rather, my aim is to
describe the functional character of the regime as one of governance, and
to signal normative messages and characteristics that make the FSC and like
approaches to social regulation worrisome, in my view, as emerging
influences in the larger debate about how we govern ourselves.
Under the FSC, the regulation of consumer behaviour comes most
directly from the regime's coordination of information available to
consumers and its quieting effect on boycotts, as markets once disappearing
or fraught with risk reopen. The FSC regulates producer behaviour by
45
46

Supra note 19 at 256.
Stepan Wood, "Greenwash or Green Revolution? Voluntary Environmental Standards, Public

Law and Private Authority in Canada" (Paper prepared for the 2001 Annual Legal Dimensions
Initiative, 17 November 2001) [unpublished]. On the interplay of public and private in standard setting,
see also Liora Salter, Mandated Science: Science and Scientistsin the Making of Standards (Dordrecht,
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1988).
47 Gunther Teubner, "'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society" in Gunther
Teubner, ed., Global Law Without a State (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997).
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defining principles, criteria, and standards that a company must, according
to the rules of the regime, meet to achieve and maintain access to the logo
and implicitly, those markets sensitive to the logo. Producers and
consumers alike are drawn into the FSC's processes for defining and
implementing the standards. The FSC becomes thus an important forum for
debate on the meaning of sustainable forest management, within the
institutional and structural constraints of its design. Perhaps less obviously,
the regime also spills out of consumer-producer relations into citizen-stateproducer relations when FSC rules incorporate state rules and vice versa,
when government officials participate in the FSC's processes, and when the
FSC becomes seen as an alternative (albeit partial) to state-based policy
development and regulation.
The certification approach is part of larger trends toward marketoriented forms of governance, and has a fitness with contemporary
conditions that makes it attractive to pragmatists, but at the same time
should raise warning signals for those concerned about neo-liberal
influences on governance. For example, the standardization of expectations
suits transnational companies that wish to simplify their regulatory burden,
reduce risks along the supply chain, open access to markets, and avoid
conflicts with ENGOs. The institutionalization of a non-state-based regime
addressing industry behaviour creates opportunities for reduced
government expenditure and downsizing at a time when this is fiscally and
ideologically attractive. Standards developed by apparently private entities,
and voluntarily adopted by companies are less likely than statutory law to48
be considered barriers to trade under World Trade Organization rules.
The ability of the regime to reach across borders and address popular
concerns about unsustainable or inappropriate trade provides a means of
promoting sustainable development, economic growth, and prosperity via
foreign trade, without having to address states' varying capacities to
regulate via conventional means.
The more civil society-based regimes, like the FSC, are often
advocated as a response to the democratic "deficits" created by
globalization. Enthusiasts about the potential of greater civil society
involvement in governance, especially globally, see the flowering of nonstate centered institutions and functional groupings as a solution to the
democratic deficits created by globalization. For example, Ronnie
Lipschutz imagines a future condition in which "regulatory authority is
likely to be distributed among many foci of political action, organized to
48 Matthias Finger & Ludivine Tamiotti, "New Global Regulatory Mechanisms and the

Environment: The Emerging Linkage Between the wTo and the Iso" (1999) 30(3) IDS Bulletin 8 at
11.
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address specific issue-areas rather than to exercise a generalized rule over
a specific territory. ' '49 He sees the growth in functional authority of nonstate actors as more likely than state-based institutions of global forest
governance.50 In the labour context, David Trubek, Jim Mosher, and Jeffrey
Rothstein argue that given both corporate power and that a return to state
centrism is not realistic, the best solution is a "multi-layered approach,"
where
[t]ransnational public and private actors would operate not only at the national level but

also in public and private arenas within and beyond national borders. Such actions could
create a mosaic of normative orders and norms that would, taken together, establish a
multi-level, public-private, cascading, transnational regime for labour regulation. 1

Drawing on administrative law principles, Alfred Aman, while
identifying that "democracy requires the means by which issues can be
drawn, information shared, and a meaningful politics created," proposes
improving the transparency, participation, and accountability of
privatization steps taken by governments as a way of redressing the
imbalance. Examples include reforming the procedures for contracting out
functions previously handled by government, making greater use of
independent, third party monitors, and taking steps to improve information
flows and opportunities for political discourse. Aman suggests
organizations like the FSC can assist with conflict of interest problems when
they provide the third party monitoring function.52
Implicit in these pragmatic (or resigned) assessments of
certification approaches as better-than-nothing solutions to an intractable
and inevitable problem is a shift in governance at the levels of norms,
institutions, and power, even if one would prefer it to be simply another
tool alongside a strong or reconstituted state. As articulated in more detail
below, at risk is a freer exploration of reinventions of the state and
collective action for public ends. Pragmatism about corporate power and
Ronnie Lipschutz, "Why Is There No International Forestry Law? An Examination
of
International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private" (2000/2001) 19 UCLAJ. Envtl. L. & Pol'y
153 at 162.
50
Ibid. at 163.
51 David M. Trubek, Jim Mosher & Jeffrey S.Rothstein, "Transnationalism
and the Regulation
of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks" (2000) L. & Soc.
Inquiry 1187 at 1189.
52
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., "Globalization, Democracy and the Need for a New Administrative Law"
(2002) 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1687 at 1712-13 [Aman, "Globalization"]; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., "The
Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and
Democracy" (1998) 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769 [Aman, "The Globalizing State"].
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enthusiastic trust in existing NGOs should not blind us to this; rather, careful
attention to alternatives and the ways these alternatives fall away from
public discourse is imperative.
IV. IMPLICIT POLITICS
In the enthusiasm for building an alternative voice to
counterbalance economic forces, commentators on the rise of civil societybased, market-oriented responses have not yet developed a thorough
analysis of the implicit politics of certification as a form of governance. The
remainder of this article is meant to move this project forward by
considering three types of implicit politics.
First, those commentators who take "governance" seriously,
whether from within political science, legal pluralism, or global civil society
literatures, emphasize the significance of norm generation as a form of
social control. Much of the strength behind transnational advocacy
networks rests on their ability to mobilize norms-regarding human rights,
ecological sustainability, labour conditions, and so on-in effective ways,
yielding institutions and regimes with demonstrable impact on corporations
and other involved entities' behaviour.5" What then are the underlying
norms of the certification approach?
Second, the FSC has a particular institutional form and relationship
to state-based regulatory institutions. In many ways it is a model institution,
with carefully designed voting mechanisms, opportunities for consultations,
and transparent procedures. But considered as a whole, the institutional
characteristics of the regime give cause for concern. Given its institutional
form, what can be reasonably expected from the regime in terms of
transparency, participation, and accountability, and in what ways might the
institutional structure be path-determining in terms of outcomes?
Third, if the certification approach is promised as an answer to the
problem of expanding private power at the expense of democratic polities,
what shifts in power dynamics are in fact taking place? Perhaps not
surprisingly given their origins, labour lawyers have had more to say in this
regard about codes for labour standards than commentators on
environmental codes. But we can take our cue regarding what questions to
ask from them: who is empowered by the structural, institutional, and
normative dynamics of the certification approach?

Paul Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics"
(1995) 47 World Pol. 311; Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in InternationalPolitics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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GovernanceNorms Implicit in the CertificationApproach

A fundamental norm of the certification approach is its preference
for individual action within markets over collective action via public
institutions. There are many ways in which this root orientation manifests
itself.
One way is by decentering the state. Government officials become
one more stakeholder in standards-development processes and fade into
the background in the day-to-day mechanics of administering a certification
regime. The role of government is not to lead and create capacity for the
achievement of collective goals; rather, the certification regime does that
for its membership. Democratic legitimacy, as a foundational justification
for actions with governance implications, fades from view and is displaced
by discourses of voluntarism and the avoidance of interference with
markets. The FSC does provide substantial opportunities for member and
public input as well as procedures for transparency, especially in the
processes for creating standards. Also, as described, great pains were taken
to balance economic, social, and environmental sector members within its
federal structure. But the FSC does not, ultimately, have the democratic
legitimacy of a state-based process. It speaks not for all those in a given
territory, or all those affected by companies bearing its certification, but for
its members. Its reason for existing, responsibilities, and accountability
relate to a single-issue mission.
The role of government as an entity that creates conditions for
collective living and effective markets, and that sanctions bad actors, also
takes a backseat. In relations with government officials, co-operation, as
opposed to sanctioning, becomes the operating metaphor.54 One can find
requirements to obey domestic law written into standards as well as implicit
dependence on existing public institutions and legal regimes to provide
conditions for the achievement of the certification regime's stated goals.
This dependence, however, is only implicit. Certification regimes hide this
reality,55 promoting themselves as drawing their dynamism and regulatory
power from market forces. This devaluation of the state's role can lead to
circular referencing, where governments demand certification as a
substantial element of regulation, while the certification standard demands
compliance with government regulation. Critiquing the ISO 14001 standard,

54 Wood, supra note 46 at 44.
55
Adelle Blackett, "Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law
Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct" (2001) 8 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 401 at 415-22.
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Martin von Mirbach warns that what can result is "a perfect con game, with
regulations everywhere in appearance but nowhere in effect."56
Even when the certification regime demands more in terms of
substantive standards, as the FSc does in comparison to the management
systems orientation of the ISO, the emphasis on markets as the more
effective mechanism for regulating behaviour remains. The promise is that
markets can deliver not just consumer goods and services, but public goods,
political rights, fair treatment for indigenous peoples, sustainable and wellfunctioning ecosystems, and so on, better than public institutions. In the
FSC case, these aspirations are written into the principles, criteria, and
regional standards in a variety of ways. We must ask, however, what the
reasonable expectations are from this codification, given the larger context
in which the FSC functions.
The states versus markets debate is obviously a deep and extended
one. My purpose for the present is simply to point to some of the ways the
certification approach supports market organization as a norm of
governance, even in the model form represented by the FSC. For example,
the implicit message that markets are more effective than governments
sidelines policy debates that demand state action. In the British Columbia
case, there are some key things only the state can do. Tenure reform is an
example. The existing tenure regime substantially confines opportunities
for more ecologically sustainable logging." Reforming this regime requires
major restructuring of the legislative framework within which logging
occurs, with complex implications for the work force, forest ecosystems,
organization of government, public revenues, and so on.
Advocates of the certification approach suggest it can help generate
political will to develop better legislative frameworks for sustainable
logging, but the evidence here is far from clear. On tenure, for example, the
British Columbia regional standards provide scope for conventional tenure
holders to gain FSC certification.58 The certification approach is also
56 Martin von Mirbach, "Demanding Good Wood" in Robert Gibson, ed., Voluntary Initiatives:

The New Politics of CorporateGreening (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999) 211 at 223.
57

See Cheri Burda et al.,
Forests in Trust: Reforming British Columbia's Forest Tenure System for

Ecosystem and Community Health (Victoria: Eco-Research Chair of Environmental Law & Policy,
1997); Marchak, Aycock & Herbert, supra note 22; Cashore et al.,
supra note 19.
58 Standard 2.1.1.(c) provides that Tree Farm Licence holders are eligible, while 2.1.1.(d)
provides that the volume-based Forest Licences will also be sufficient if the licensee applies together
with the Province or the Province provides written assurance it will demand adherence to the Fsc
principles when it issues licences, permits or approvals of plans, and the Province commits to ensuring
the volume cut matches FSC's Criterion 5.6 (that the rate of harvest does not exceed that which can be

permanently sustained). See Forest Stewardship Council Regional Certification Standards for British
Columbia, online: <http://www.fsc-bc.org/SiteCM/U/D/FSC%20Cda%20approved
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consistent-in fact, more so than the existing tenure system in British
Columbia-with privatization of public forest land in British Columbia, a
policy pursued from time to time by the provincial government and
advocated by the U.S. softwood lumber lobby. The provincial government's
move to a more performance-based Forest PracticesCode,59 the form of
which has been strongly opposed by the environmental community in
British Columbia, is also conceptually consistent with the certification
approach. While introducing its proposed code, the provincial government
gave the move toward certification as a reason why the risks associated with
adopting a more hands-off, performance-based approach in provincial
legislation were "manageable., 60 During consultations on the new code, the
Council of Forest Industries (COFI) lobbied for much greater recognition
of certification. COFI suggested certified companies should be in a separate
category, such that certification requirements become code requirements,
compliance and enforcement efforts target uncertified companies, and
random audits by the Forest Practices Board focus only on uncertified
companies. 6 How certification will affect regulatory oversight, compliance,
and enforcement of forest practices remains unclear, but it could play a role
in justifying a lower level of scrutiny and deferential substantive rules, and
in redefining due diligence. The form of legal ordering implied by the
certification approach seems to suggest more, not less, private control.
Outside the British Columbia context, Hale Sheppard has argued
that certification-he refers to the ISO and FSC as two examples of the same
overall strategy-provides a means for Chile to enhance its forest
protection and may "permit the fortification of existing legislation."
Sheppard argues that change is inevitable and certification is the means,
citing Chile's export orientation and the national government's desire to
secure access to foreign markets. Additionally, Sheppard notes that
environmental groups shifted from boycotts to acceptance of international

%20BC%2OStds.pdf> (date accessed: 7 August 2003).
59
Ministry of Forests and Ministry of Water, Air and Land Protection "A Results-Based Forest
online:
and Range Practices Regime for British Columbia,"
<www.for.gov.bc.ca/code/discussionpaper/dpaper.pdf> (date accessed: 19 May 2003); Bill 74, Forest
and Range Practices Act, 3d Sess., 37th Leg., British Columbia, 2002 (obtained Royal Assent 21
November 2002), S.B.C. 2002, c. 69.
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trade, provided that sustainable methods of production could be
established. In response to the criticism that certification could remove
incentives for the development of domestic legislation, Sheppard argues
that certification could "substantially facilitate the administrative
procedures associated with national legislation" by such means as easing
requirements for management plans prepared by forest companies, and
simplifying environmental impact assessment requirements. He also
suggests the incorporation of FSC standards into national legislation as a
means of enhancing regulatory capacity.62 Sheppard cites a national
certification initiative of the Chilean government, which has the objective
of improving access to export markets, as evidence of the government's
willingness to act.63 But this example also reflects the displacement of
alternatives less compatible with neo-liberal demands on the Chilean
government, in favour of certification as an apparent but unproven method
of making the best of a bad situation. Certification-developed through
non-state based processes-becomes accepted evidence of good behaviour
in place of other forms of regulation.
Another implicit message of the certification approach is that public
regulation is always directed at market failures.6 4 Such a presumption
denies the existence of bona fide public goals that are not efficient for
markets. If a certification regime includes significant requirements that are
not efficient, the regime cannot be expected to be attractive to companies
operating in a competitive environment. The transformation of corporate
culture to embrace the profitability of "green" practices cannot, after all,
be expected to go beyond profitability. The goals of a demos, in contrast,
are not necessarily so limited.
Mark Sagoff has argued that people have different identities as
citizens than they do as consumers, such that their motives, concerns, and
preferences are different when they act as citizens from when they act as
consumers.65 The message that one's actions as a consumer are more
effective denies this distinction. It implies that these identities can be
subsumed within the consumer, and that individual action is the same as
collective action. Implicit in Sagoff's argument is an understanding that
participating in a democratic polity is constitutive of identity. Redefining
62

Hale Sheppard, "Timber Certification: An Alternative Solution to the Destruction of Chilean

Forests" (1999) 14 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 301 at 323.
63
Ibid. at 341.
64 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law andthe Environment (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 14.
65

Ibid. at 16-17.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.41, NOS.

2 &3

participation as consumer action implies a different constitution of identity,
one based on individual wants, that equates worth as a participant with
buying power and devalues experiences of collective effort toward common
goals. Power becomes the ability to satisfy preferences, while structural and
institutional power fade to the background. Citing William Simon, Sagoff
argues that this personalization of power:
'resists understanding power as a product of class, property or institutions and collapses power
into the personal needs and dispositions of the individuals who command and obey....' Once
the affective, that is, the economic, self becomes the source of all value, the public self becomes

merely 'apparent' and cannot participate in the exercize of power. Power, indeed, appears to
be entirely private; it is the power to satisfy one's personal preferences. It ceases to be the
power to join with others in effective political action to define and pursue collective values and
shared aspirations."

The emphasis on consumer power also perpetuates the myth that
consumers drive certification systems. The FSC's motive forces are far more
complex. The membership develops standards based on a multistakeholder model. A major tension at this stage has been the balancing of
environmental and social ideals against the desire to facilitate certification
by industrial producers so that the supply can be greater and the logo can
have greater influence in larger markets. The demand for FSC-labelled
products appears so far to depend largely on the advocacy efforts of
transnational ENGOs. These efforts must inevitably be narrowly and
selectively focussed. In the end, the choices that are eventually available to
consumers are much constrained by upstream processes. These processes,
however, are shadowed by the normative emphasis on the consumer as an
agent with free and effective choice.
The emphasis on green consumerism bolsters the notion that
consumption is a good in itself. Critics of the FSC have pointed to the
consequence that markets that were dwindling due to purchasers' concerns
about the impacts of their purchases have reopened.67 In this way, the
certification movement provides legitimation for the neo-liberal ideology
of growing and trading our way to prosperity. The FSC addresses this
criticism by promising that its products are sustainably produced, but the
problem here is twofold. First is the question of effectiveness. The
ecological and social justice credentials of the FSC are yet to be proven as
66

William Simon, "Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism" (1980) 32 Stanford

L.R. 487 at 495.
67 Klemens Laschefski & Nicole Freris, "Saving the Wood" The Ecologist (26 October 2001),
online: <http://www.theecologist.org/archive-article.html?article=1067> (date accessed: 19 May
2003); Sharon Beder, GlobalSpin: The CorporateAssault on Environmentalism(Totnes, U.K.: Green
Books & Chelsea Green, 1997) at 176.

2003]

From Civil Disobedienceto Obedient Consumerism?

the regime is still in its infancy. The regime has not been immune to
criticism on this front.68 Second is the question of contribution to the
discourse on environmental governance. No matter how well the FSC may
function on the margins, it implicitly supports the larger ideology of attack
on non-market forms of social ordering and experimentation with
alternative, democratic forms of collective governance.
In addition to its emphasis on markets and individual action, the
certification approach suggests that the best way to "green" a large-scale,
industrial, extractive forest industry such as exists in British Columbia is via
a mitigative code, as opposed to addressing more fundamental structural
and institutional conditions of production. The FSC distinguishes itself from
certification systems such as the Iso by asserting its performance-based, as
opposed to management-based, character. The FSC criteria and standards
incorporate substantive elements that applicant companies must achieve,
in addition to requirements to adopt management protocols.
Commentators from the environmentalist community point to these
performance standards as the critical difference between the FSC and other
competing certification standards.69
The underlying message that better company and technical
management can achieve the desired goals, whether aspirational or
required by the standard, nevertheless remains. Alternatives that require
more fundamental reorganization, for example the British Columbia
movement for community-based forms of decision making and property
holding, are implicitly suggested to be unnecessary. The promise that the
FSC would help create pressure for this kind of policy change by making it
impossible for conventional operators to meet the criteria has yet to be
born out. The immediate evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Communal
tenure holders account for a small and decreasing proportion of the land
area managed by FSC-certified operators, while industrial and government
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operators in the North account for the majority and an ever increasing
proportion."
In sum, the certification approach narrows the debate around
appropriate responses to the ecological crisis. Although the FSC is a model
of the best that the certification approach has to offer, normative
underpinnings remain. Even with the FSC, the certification approach
channels ideas and debates about how to govern for improved
environmental sustainability toward individual as opposed to collective
solutions, market organization, and managerial solutions. These
characteristics discipline public debate in ways that undermine the
environmentalist critique of unsustainable logging and the diversity of
solutions under consideration.
InstitutionalForm

B.

If we think about certification systems as a form of governance,
what can be reasonably expected from the institutional character of the
certification approach? Although it is too early to have clear evidence as to
the mechanism's effectiveness in terms of environmental protection, it is
not too early to consider its institutional character as a method of
governance.
The FSC's organizational structure appears designed to provide
affirmative balancing of environmental and social concerns as against
economic ones, as well as a balancing of Southern members in relation to
Northern members. It further provides for regional difference with its
federal structure and provision for regional standards development. Its
procedures for standards development are quite transparent and
participatory. Membership, in the British Columbia example, appears quite
diverse, although the FSC as a whole has struggled to expand beyond
Europe and North America. This forum for debate on the meaning of
sustainable forestry thus seems less constrained by the institutional design
of the membership rules and internal decision-making structure than by the
kinds of factors discussed in the previous section. These factors include
such considerations as how to balance stringency against greater possible
market share for the logo, subtler influences on participation such as
capacity and resources, and the utility and relevance of the regime given
local conditions. It must also be remembered that the institutional design
of the certification approach raises democratic legitimacy questions as rules
70
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developed by entities without democratic accountability come to be
applied, perhaps pervasively, and influence legislative processes.
Regarding institutional design for accountability, the presumption
of effective market pressure links to limited accountability measures within
the FSC framework itself. Certification bodies, themselves accredited by the
FSC to be hired by applicants for FSC certification, control much of this side
of the FSC's institutional arrangements. Certification bodies decide whether
an applicant has met a sufficient proportion of FSC standards to merit
certification. Certification bodies monitor progress and determine whether
a successful applicant is continuing to maintain FSC standards. As Errol
Meidinger points out, these decision-making processes are poorly
understood outside certifier circles and are essentially opaque to other
observers.71 The FSC system depends substantially on the professionalism
of certification bodies, which tend to be large management consulting
firms.
The FSC's oversight of its certification bodies is necessarily minimal,
given its own limited administrative capacity. Furthermore, private control
of information collected by certification bodies inhibits dialogue among
certifiers and the public-dialogue that Meidinger asserts is necessary to
develop consistency and legitimate definitions of appropriate practices.72
This institutional form inevitably favours the expertise of the technical
consultant, drawing any dispute about a certifier's actions into an arena
defined by the consultant's professional standards. In comparison to the
day-to-day practices and authority generated here, the monitoring and
public disclosure of bad practices by NGOs and other outside observers
must, at best, be an occasional and blunt tool for keeping the FSC and its
agents accountable to the standards. Doubtless there are hot spots, and
British Columbia's coastal rainforest is one, where the NGO community is
watching carefully to see how FSC certification will progress, but the FSC
structure does not itself generate such watchfulness. In other regions, the
scrutiny cannot be expected to be as strong. Even where NGOs are on alert
and have substantial capacity, the threat of discrediting the logo remains a
blunt tool and those NGOs most involved are also most committed to the
success of the FSC and the continuing viability of the label.
Meidinger also highlights the discretionary character of standards
that allow much professional judgement and balancing on site." Alfred
Aman has proposed extending administrative law principles to private
71 Supra note 41 at 152.
Ibid. at 153.
Ibid. at 232-33.
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regulatory systems as a means of redressing this problem.74 Just how this
might be done is unclear. In British Columbia, the public law regime has
also been characterized by much discretion being accorded to Ministry of
Forests officials, and despite administrative law protections, this discretion
has proved largely elusive to substantive review. The certification approach
arguably provides less here than the existing, already ineffective
arrangement, with less formal protection and less access to information.
The FSC's dispute resolution protocol favours informal negotiation,
but provides a mechanism for bringing disputes to the international board.
Complaints under the protocol must be brought by members or a
certification body. A potential complainant who, for example, believes a
certified forestry operation is violating FSC standards is expected to pursue
informal negotiation or arbitration. The complainant is expected to bring
the matter to the certifying body, and then to the certification body's
independent committee, before making use of the procedures in the
protocol. Once under the protocol, the FSC will again attempt negotiation
before falling back on a formal process of dispute resolution. The British
Columbia standards define involvement in "outstanding disputes of
substantial magnitude involving a significant number of interests" as a
"major failure," that, if breached, would be grounds for denying
certification.76 What "outstanding," "substantial magnitude," and
"significant number of interests" may mean is unclear. Accreditation
decisions may be appealed by a member of the FSC under the dispute
resolution protocol.
The bureaucratic character of the certification process is another
institutional dimension that influences participation by smaller logging
companies and other forms of association for managing forests. The cost
and administrative capacity required to move through the certification
process mean that large-scale producers and producers organized along
bureaucratic lines as opposed to traditional forms of forest use and
management are at an advantage.77 The FSC has attempted to redress this
barrier to participation by developing group certifications, but the problem
remains. As noted, the evidence to date indicates that large-scale producers
account for the dominant and increasing share of certified hectares.
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The certification approach also imports institutional weaknesses of
market organization. The market pressures to grow the logo, loosen
standards, and ignore violations are strong. The lure of attracting big
business is evident in concessions on certifying plantations and the
percentage content required for products bearing the FSC logo.7 8 The
demand remains small, consumer attention to any particular campaign is
fleeting, and the quality of available information tends to the aggregate and
general. The FSC must compete with other standards, marketing to
distinguish it from the others which do not have the performance standards
required by the FSC. Standards such as the ISO 14001, for example, and
American Forest and Paper Association's Sustainable Forestry Initiative
are growing faster than the FSC in British Columbia.79
Given the limits of the accountability mechanisms within the FSC
itself, the regime depends on NGOs and consumers to maintain vigilance
over its integrity, implying requirements of time, money, and capacity for
competent monitoring. But the capacity of the NGO community is easy to
overestimate and commitments here inevitably mean less commitment
elsewhere. The FSC itself is heavily dependent on the support of U.S.-based
foundations, European states, and NGOs for operating funds.8" In sum,
important institutional dimensions of the certification approach work
against the FSC's apparent aspirations, contain opportunities for
environmentalist protest, and limit what can reasonably be expected from
this approach to environmental governance.
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Effects of the CertificationApproach on Power Relations

The above discussion suggests that the certification approach brings
with it distinct conditions of empowerment and disempowerment.
Commenting on labour codes, Naomi Klein concluded that at issue is who
gets to decide both what rules will be imposed and how those rules will be
imposed. 8' In the FSC case, the who is more diverse than in industrydeveloped codes of conduct. But while the FSC may be a best-case scenario,
it still transfers power, normatively and institutionally, from public
institutions to its major actors: consulting firms, logging companies, and a
few transnational environmental organizations. Consumers in Europe and
North America with discretionary income also take on greater stature.
Bureaucratic and managerial characteristics mean large, integrated
companies gain advantage and greatest return from the regime.82 These
same characteristics may reasonably be expected to undermine
performance-based standards in relation to management-oriented ones,
giving advantage to industry as against accountability seekers. In the labour
context, the management framework for monitoring used by consulting
firms has been observed to systematically enhance the position of
companies in relation to workers.8 3 These same kinds of questions need to
be examined in the environmental context, but the logic appears
transferable.
The limited capacity of the NGO community suggests that the
empowerment trumpeted by advocates of greater civil society involvement
in governance via, among other things, certification regimes like the FSC
may be significantly overstated. Considering ENGOS in North America in
the context of North American Free Trade Agreement activism, Steven
Clarkson concluded that "the existence of North American environmental
governance from below must be heavily qualified," that NGO organizing
tended to be fragmentary, evolutionary, and reactive, and that "[c]ivil
society's capacity to engage at the continental level in effective ways to

81 Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Toronto: Vintage, 2000) at 435.
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combat social degradation or to enhance environmental and societal
sustainability is ... dangerously limited."'
In one of the more thorough treatments of transnational civil
society-based advocacy, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that the
concept of networks of activist communities better describes the
organization and content of NGO activities than "global civil society." After
researching a cross-section of activist networks, Keck and Sikkink
concluded that their findings
[d]o not yet support the strong claims about an emerging global civil society. We are much
more comfortable with a conception of transnational civil society as an arena of struggle,
a fragmented and contested area where 'the politics of transnational civil society is centrally
about the way in which certain groups emerge and are legitimized (by governments,
institutions, and other groups).'"

To the extent the certification approach depends on the NGO community
replacing states as monitors, sanctioners, and regulatory influences, the
limitations of NGO capacity can only be expected to become more apparent
as states retreat.
This dependence on NGOs also raises questions about NGO
accountability and, returning to earlier themes, democratic legitimacy. It
should be noted that the transnational ENGOS that have been most
prominent in the FSC regime are European and U.S.-based. This aspect of
the FSC reproduces Northern dominance within the FSC regime, despite the
attempts noted to redress North-South power imbalances through the
voting structure. Transnational ENGOS' goals are not always consistent with
more local groups such that the empowerment of one does not necessarily
imply the empowerment of the other.16 In British Columbia, the carrot of
certification and stick of boycotts has been used effectively for wilderness
protection goals, which tend to be a top priority for transnational ENGOS.
However, this preservationist emphasis runs the risk of sidelining some of
the most important issues on the domestic scene including First Nations'
self-determination and control over traditional territories, sustainable
community development, access to land for community-based small
84
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businesses, and the problem that reduced harvests in those coastal
rainforests that are the focus of campaigns will be compensated for by overharvesting elsewhere in the province absent a province-wide solution. The
overall problem that the institutional framework promotes unsustainable
forestry in the province remains intact.
The certification approach inevitably involves a redistribution of
power in complex, subtle, and contradictory ways. This issue must be
addressed before realistic assessments of the potential of the certification
approach to deliver improvements in environmental governance can be
made.
V.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion raises important factors for assessing what can
reasonably be expected from the certification approach, even in a model
situation like the FSC, as a mechanism for working out the meaning of
sustainable production and making it a reality. At stake is more than
accountability, as liberal commentators frequently reduce the democratic
challenge posed by globalization, or substantive effectiveness in terms of a
particular social goal as typically framed by commentators on codes of
conduct. Rather, the turn toward markets and certification involves a more
fundamental shift in governance.
As summarized by Meidinger, these regimes "reshape domestic and
international policy institutions by changing the locus, dynamics, and
substance of policy-making." 87 Solutions proposed tend to suggest
reforming codes for greater transparency and accountability, 8 but the
analysis presented here suggests that the deeper limitations of voluntary
codes as a form of governance need to be clarified and recognized.
Idealized descriptions of a civil society renaissance face serious limitations
within neo-liberal governance frames. Further efforts to explore the
potential here may benefit from considering the conditions described by
theorists of associative democracy as necessary to make that model of
democracy work.89
Perhaps of most concern are the ways that the certification
movement appears to be disciplining public debate about alternatives as
pragmatic or resigned commentators on the one hand, and advocates of
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neo-liberal reforms on the other, confine themselves to market-based
solutions. In this assessment, although progress can be made to improve
certification regimes, and the FSC is in many ways a model here, the
possibilities appear limited by structural, institutional, and normative
conditions and characteristics of the approach. If this assessment is
accepted, then the bigger issue to address is how to generate renewed
emphasis on experimentation with democratic forms of governance, taking
care to identify their implicit politics.

